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Article 4

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process of Law.-Validity of Building line Restriction in Zoning Ordinance. Pursuant
to statutory authority, the City of Pittsburgh passed a zoning
ordinance providing, inter alia, that in all of the districts set aside
for residential purposes "there shall be a front yard having a
depth of not less than fifteen feet. (b) When the front wall of
80 per cent of all the buildings on one side of the street between
two intersecting streets have been kept back from the street line,
no building hereafter erected or altered shall be placed nearer to
the street line than the distance established by the majority of
the 80 per cent, at the time of the passage of this Act; provided
that this regulation shall not be interpreted to reduce the buildable width of a corner lot facing on an intersecting street, of
record, at the time of the passage of this ordinance, to less than
twenty-five feet."
The appellant enclosed a porch, converting, it into a room,
thus violating the above section of the zoning ordinance. The
city officials ordered the structure to be removed. On an appeal
taken from a judgment in the Court of Common Pleas in favor
of the city, the superior court reversed the judgment, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The
reason for the decision was that the section of the ordinance violated was unconstitutional, as being opposed to the Fourteenth
Amendment. The taking of land under this part of the ordinance-does not constitute due process of law, and cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police 'power of the State.
Held also, the discrimination was unjust. Appeal of White et al.,
(Supr. Ct. of Pa., 1926) 134 Atl. 409.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently upheld the
validity of general zoning ordinances which divide the city into districts, and regulate the land and buildings in each district. Village
of Euclid et al. v. Ambler Realty Co., (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 114. And
many States are in accord. Opinion of Justices (Mass.) 127 N. E.
525; Inspector of Buildings of Lowell v. Stoklosa, 145 N. E. 262;
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Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 145 N. E. 265; State v.
City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams
Building Corporation,128 N. E. 209; City of Aurora v. Burns, 149
N. E. 784; Deynzer v. City of Evanston, 149 N. E. 790; State ex rel.
Carterv. Harper, 196 N. W. 451; Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 Pac.
99; City of Providence v. Stephens, 33 At. 614; Miller v. Board of
Public Works, 234 Pac. 381. Contra: Goldman v. Crowthers, 128
Atl. 50; Ignaciunus v. Risley, 121 At. 783; Spann v. City of Dallas,
234 S. W. 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, supra, it was
held also that when a zoning ordinance is" attacked in a broad
sense, the Court will not determine the constitutionality of minor
provisions which if attacked separately might be held unconstitutional.
Ordinances providing for the establishment of building lines
have been repeatedly held to be unconstitutional. A leading
case on this point is Ewbank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137.
In this case the United States Supreme Court held that an ordinance which declared, "that whenever the owners of two-thirds
of property abutting on any street shall in writing request the
Committee on Streets to establish a building line on the side of
the square on which their property fronts the said Committee
shall establish such line so that the same shall not be less than
five feet more than thirty feet from the street line", was unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
it could not be justified under the police power because it did not
promote the health, morals or general welfare of the public. The
purpose would be merely aesthetic. Accord: St. Louis v. Hill,
22 S. W. 861; Byrnes v. Riverton, 44 Atl. 857; People ex rel Dilzer
v. Calder, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1015.
There i~s a tendency now in some courts to consider aesthetic
reasons sufficient to put laws within the scope -of the police
power. The billboard eases furnish an excellent example of this
tendency. Most of the cases prior to 1911 held that billboard
regulations were not a valid exercise of the police power. They
were said to be based upon aesthetic reasons alone, and were
thought to strain the original idea of the police power a little
too much. Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Company, 64 At. 227;
Peofile ex ret 'Winelurgh Advertising Company v. Murphy, 29 App.
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Div. (N. Y.) 260. Later cases, however, have upheld billboard
regulations as a legitimate exercise of police power, although
the courts did not expressly approve aesthetic considerations.
Thus, in St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 144 S. W. 1099, the
court said: "Signboards upon which advertisements were
placed are a constant menace to the public safety and welfare of
the city; they endanger public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all classes of
miscreants."
Evidently the court did not realize that most
structures are just as liable to shield "criminals and miscreants".
See, for a comparison of cases on Billboard Regulations and
Zoning Ordinances, "Aesthetic Zoning Regulations" in XXV Mich.
Law Rev. 124; also 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998 note. It seems probable that if there develop sufficient public demand for ordinances
based upon aesthetic motives, the courts will construe such ordinances to be a necessary regulation within the police power.
Modem tribunals seem loath to invalidate majority opinions.
P.L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Power of the Senate and
House to compel private individual to appear and give testimony.
-The Senate and House passed a resolution authorizing and
directing a committee of five senators to investigate and report
facts concerning charges brought to their attention of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice while Harry
Daugherty held the office of Attorney General. The purpose of
the investigation was to afford Congress information to aid it in
serving Mal Daugherty, a brother of I-arry, with process commanding him to appear before it to give testimony relating to the
charges under investigation. He failed to comply and the Senate
adopted a resolution directing that process be issued compelling
him to appear before the Senate to answer questions pertinent
to the investigation. A deputy sergeant at arms took Daugherty
into custody and the latter brought a writ of Habeas Corpus in
the District Court of Southern Ohio where he was discharged.
299 Fed. 620. The deputy appealed to the Supreme Court which
reversed the decision of the lower court and held, "the Senate
and House may issue process to compel a private individual to
appear and give testimony needed to enable efficient exercise of
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legislative functions conferred by the Constitution', and the
"power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
necessary auxiliary to legislative functions". McGrain v. Daugherty (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 319.
This decision of the Supreme court was to be expected in
view of earlier decisions of that body holding that the power resides in Congress to compel appearance and disclosures for the
purpose of efficiently discharging legitimate functions, (Zn re
Chapman 166 U. S. 661, 17 Sup. Ct. 677, 41 L. ED. 1154; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson 154 U. S. 447,14 Sup. Ct.
1125, 38 L. ED. 1047) and in view of the generally accepted principle that the power to legislate carries with it the implied power
of inquiry as incident and indispensable to the creation of wholesome legislation (People v. Keeler 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615, 52
Am. Rep. 49; Burnham v. Morrissey 14 Gray (Mass.) 226, 74 Am.
Dec. 676). Nothwithstanding the theory of separation and delegation of governmental powers, Congress has power to punish
for contempt (even a private individual) for action calculated to
harrass the House in the exercise of its legislative proceedings.
Marshall v. Gordon 243 U. S. 521, 37 Sup. Ct. 448, 61 L. Ed.
881, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371. The principal
case in all its ramifications goes a long way toward the settlement of many disputes regarding the procedure and propriety
of Congressional Investigating Committees, and for this reason
should be read and studied to appreciate its importance.
W. L. T.
Thereof.-A
INTENTION-Sufficiency
DEDICATION
plat of land was to be granted for the purpose of providing proper
sidewalks for the city of Winnetka. The land was surveyed, and
to all appearances, dedication was to follow. The Supreme Court
of Illinois in Village of Winnetka v. Lyons et al (1926), 154 N. E.
207 held that in order to dedicate land to public use, evidence
must show satisfactorily that a dedication has taken place and
that the mere fact that the owner considered dedicating this
property and had it surveyed was insufficient to prove the dedication. The law is well settled on this proposition and the courts
have repeatedly declared that the intention to dedicate must be
clearly established. Mere consideration is not enough, even
though the intention may be quite obvious, for something more
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than deliberation is required. Some overt act of dedication
must be proved in addition to the intention. This is shown in
City of Chicago v. Johnson, 98 Ill. 618. In Tiffany on page 973
the author declares "The act of dedication is, however, affirmative in character, and the intention to dedicate must be clearly
shown". In 8 R. C. L. page 889, 'we find the same essential that
clarity of intention must be satisfactorily shown to prove the
dedication. The same rule is laid down in Davidson v. Reed, 111
Illinois 167 and also in Town of Marion v. Skillman 127 Ind. 130.
In the principal case the owner of the land made the purvey
for his own particular information and use at the time that he
considered the question of dedication. There was no element of
an estoppel in this survey' and the Illinois court's reasoning in
deciding against such an estoppel is in accordance with the better
S. W.
and most popular rule.
JURY,-Right of Impartial Trial.-Officet providing jury
lists belonging to secret society interested in conviction. Defendant was convicted of possession, transportation and sale of
intoxicating liquor. Evidence was tendered by him which was
partly received, and partly excluded, tending to prove that the
chief witness for the state was a detective hired by the Ku Klux
Klan and the Ministerial Union for the purpose of investigating and
detecting violations of the liquor law with particular attention
directed toward the activity of defendat. The officers entrusted
by law with the selection of the jury lists were members of the
Klan and had contributed to a common fund, raised by the Klan
and the Ministerial Union, and paid to the detective for his services.
The defendant made a timely motion to quash the panel-which
was denied. This refusal was assigned as error and on appeal
to the Supreme Court that body reversed the conviction and
held, "It is essential to a fair, impartial administration of justice
that the list "of sixty names from which the jury is drawn, shall
not be selected by officers having an interest in the result of the
litigation to be tried by such panel," and, "Where officers providing a jury list from which the jury panel is drawn, at the time.
of the performance of such duties, in their individual capacities,
in combination with members of a secret society in which they
have memberships, engage in an endeavor to secure the conviction of a certain defendant, and, for that purpose have employed
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or caused to be employed, and at their private expebse are compensating a detective to secure evidence and act as'complaining

witness", the panel so selected is subject to a motion to quash.
Nelson v. State, (Sup. Ct. Neb. 1926) 211 N. W. 175.
Jury commissioners may be disqualified from acting in the
selection of jury lists by reason of their relationship by blood or
marriage to the litigants or prosecutor or in a criminal case by
their active part in securing defendant's arrest or prosecution.

"Juries", 35 C. J. sec. 208, 209, citing cases; 16 R. C. L. 233.
W. L. T.

